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BACKGROUND
On or about May 29, 1993, Dr. Jerald G. Seare ("Dr. Seare")
file an appeal from the judgment and order of the District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable F.
Dennis Frederick presiding.

On or about August 5, 1993, the

defendants filed a responsive brief.

The Court heard oral

argument on Dr. Seare's appeal and issued an opinion affirming
the decision of the trial court below on or about September 15,
1994.
ARGUMENT
Dr. Seare petitions this Court, pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate procedure, for rehearing of his appeal
from the judgment and order of the Third Judicial District Court.
This Court issued its opinion on Dr. Seare's appeal on September
15, 1994. Dr. Seare's Petition for Rehearing is based on several
points of fact and law which have been overlooked and/or
misapprehended by the Court.
Dr. Seare contends that the Court erred in affirming the
decision of the court below granting summary judgment in favor of
appellees/defendants.

There are several key, material facts

which are in genuine dispute.

Moreover, as a matter of law the

appellees/defendants were not entitled to judgment in the court
below nor were they entitled to an affirmance of that judgment by
the Court.

The record on appeal as well as the opinion of this

Court corroborate Dr. Seare's contentions.
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I.

THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED UTAH LAW REGARDING AMBIGUOUS
CONTRACTS WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CONTRACT TERMS WERE
AMBIGUOUS AND THEN PROCEEDED TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE.

On page six (6) of the its opinion, the Court states
We conclude that this language [as to "appropriate
certificate" and "satisfactory completion"] is ambiguous and
therefore look to other language in the contract to
determine the intent of the parties. ... Because the
contract is ambiguous, we further determine the University's
obligations by looking
to extrinsic
evidence
submitted to
the trial court.
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals dated September 15, 1994 at
page 6.

In Utah, summary judgment is inappropriate when the

intent of the parties cannot be determined as a result of an
ambiguous contract.
In interpreting a contract, it is a well settled rule that
the court looks initially to the four corners of the document to
determine the intent of the parties.
Inc.

v. St.

Mark's

Charities,

1993); Anesthesiologists
Hospital,

HCA Health

Service

of

Utah,

846 P.2d 476, 484 (Utah Ct. App.

Associates

of Ogden v. St.

852 P.2d 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Benedicts

Moreover, because

in the instant case there are several contracts executed between
the parties which are clearly interrelated, the contracts "must
be construed as a whole and harmonized, if possible."
Service

of Utah,

(citing

Verhoef

1987) (quoting

Inc.

v. St.

v. Aston,
Atlas

Corp.

Mark's

Charities,

HCA Health

846 P.2d at 484

740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah Ct. App.
v. Clovis

Nat'l

Bank,

737 P.2d 225,

229 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted))).
While looking at the contract to determine the intent of the
parties, the court must necessarily determine whether the intent
-2-

of the parties is ambiguous.

Whether the terms of the contract

are ambiguous is a question of law. Anesthesiologists
of Ogden v. St.

Benedicts

Tayco Construction

Co.,

Hospital,

Associates

852 P.2d at 1035; Sparrow

v.

846 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

This question of law must be decided prior to the consideration
of parol or other extrinsic evidence.
665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).

Faulkner

v.

Farnsworth,

Only if the court determines as

a matter of law that the terms of the contract are ambiguous, can
it consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the
Sparrow

parties.

Case Roofing

v.

Tayco Construction

& Asphalt

v. Blomquist,

Co.,

846 P.2d 1323; Ron

773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).

It is evident from reading the opinion of the Court, that the
intent of the parties was ambiguous.

Such a determination was

properly made by the Court.
However, because of the ambiguity, it was inappropriate for
the Court and the trial court below to consider extrinsic
evidence.

"If a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence should

be considered to determine the parties' intent, and

x

[qluestions

of intent as determined by extrinsic evidence are questions of
fact....'"
Benedicts
Corbett,

Anesthesiologists
Hospital,

Associates

of Ogden v.

852 P.2d at 1035 (quoting

St.

Fitzgerald

v.

793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added).

The Utah State Supreme Court has also spoken on this issue:
[T]he court should first examine the language of the
instruments and accord to it the weight and effect which it
may show was intended and if the meaning is ambiguous or
uncertain then consider parol evidence of the parties
intentions. Faulkner v. Farnsworth,
665 P.2d at 1293
(guotingr Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P. 2d 690, 691
-3-

(Utah 1977)). Of course, a motion for summary judgment may
not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an
ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual
issue as to what the parties intended. Faulkner v.
Farnsworth,
665 P.2d at 1293 (citing
Grow v. Marwick
Development,
Inc.,
621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980)) (emphasis
added).
See also

Winegar

v. Froerer

Corp.,

813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)

("A motion for summary judgement may not be granted if a legal
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a
factual issue as to what the parties intended." (citation
omitted)).
Based on the clear and well established legal precedent, the
Court either misapprehended or overlooked Utah law and committed
error warranting rehearing when it made a legal conclusion that
the contract was ambiguous and then went on the consider
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties.
Moreover, what the parties intended is strongly contested and is
therefore a genuine issue of material fact.

Even more telling is

the recognition of the Court given to the disputed facts
regarding the intent of the parties.
The Court contrasts the conflicting evidence of Dr.
McGreevy's and Dr. Seare.
Court's discussion.

There is direct conflict in the

The Court chose to credit Dr. McGreevy's

evidence and to disbelieve Dr. Seare's evidence.

Judging the

credibility, veracity, and character of a witness is not within
the province of an appeals court.

-4-

Such a function lies within

the province of the fact finder.1
Dr. Seare's Petition for Rehearing must be granted.

Utah

law is well settled: whether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law.

If the legal conclusion is drawn that a

contract is ambiguous, then the Court must necessarily consider
parol or extrinsic evidence.

Such evidence presents a question

of fact, and in the procedural posture of a summary judgment
motion the court committed error by considering extrinsic
evidence.
II.

THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW AND/OR OVERLOOKED THE
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF
CONTRACT(S) BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

The Court failed to address the contract and/or contracts
that existed between the parties.

Initially, on page five (5) of

its opinion, the Court simply states "[r]egardless of the nature
of the 3 + 3 program, we agree with the trial court that it was
abrogated by the parties' subsequent action."

Opinion of the

1

As to Dr. Seare, the Court notes that there is nothing in
the record to substantiate the expectations of Dr. Seare.
Whether Dr. Seare's expectations are reasonable is a question of
fact and not of law. In the present case, such a determination
cannot rightfully be made by an appellate court. Moreover,
11 x
[c] ontracts are to be construed in light of the reasonable
expectations of the parties as evidenced by the purpose and
language of the contract.'" HCA Health
Services
St. Mark's
Charities,
846 P.2d at 481 (quoting

of Utah, Inc.
v.
Nixon and
Nixon,

Inc. v. John New & Associates,
641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982)).
If the contract is ambiguous as determined by the Court, then of
course, it is difficult to substantiate the expectations of the
parties. However, Dr. Seare submitted an affidavit explaining
his understanding, intent and expectations. The court has
misapprehended its role by finding substantiation in Dr.
McGreevy's position and determining that no substantiation exists
for Dr. Seare's position. This is untenable as any such
determination should be made by a finder of fact and not an
appellate court.
-5-

Utah Court of Appeals dated September 15, 1994 at page 5.

The

Court further discusses the "University's intent at this point
...."

However, the Court does not address the intent of the

parties nor the intent of Dr. Seare.
Based on the opinion of the Court, it appears from its
opinion that the Court assumed that the 3 + 3 contract did in
fact exist.

If that is the case, any modification of the

contract must have been consented to by the parties to the
contract.

Dr. Seare never intended nor consented to any

modification of his 3 + 3 contract with the defendants.
Moreover, merely because the Court posits what the intent of the
University was, such a determination does not reflect the intent
of Dr. Seare, a party to the 3 + 3 contract.

This is a question

of fact, not law, which should be determined by a fact finder.
Also, the Court fails to discuss whether there was a
contract or contracts between the parties.

The Court glosses

over this issue artfully by stating that it agrees with the trial
court below.

However, such a gloss is inappropriate.

There are

no findings regarding the nature of the contractual relationship
between the parties.

Are they governed by a block contract such

as the 3 + 3 contract or the 5 + 2 contract?

Or are the parties

governed by yearly contracts such as the house officer contracts
entered into every year between the parties?

Or are the parties

governed by both a block contract and the yearly contracts?
is a disputed question of fact, based upon the intent of the
parties.

Moreover, the terms of the various contracts and
-6-

This

whether there was a breach of the various contracts by any of the
parties is a disputed question of material fact. Any conclusions
based on the assumptions of the Court in this regard are
inappropriate without the benefit of specific findings.

The

Court failed to enunciate what the contract was that existed
between the parties.

But, how could it do so when such a

determination is a question of disputed material fact?

Thus, Dr.

Seare's Petition for Rehearing should be granted as it would
allow the Court to more carefully consider the contractual
relationship between the parties.
III. BECAUSE THE COURT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS DISCUSSES THE
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND THEN CREDITS THE TESTIMONY
OF SOME WITNESSES AND NOT OTHERS, THE COURT HAS ACTED
IN A FACT FINDING MANNER AND HAS MISAPPREHENDED ITS
FUNCTION AS A REVIEWING COURT.
The Court's opinion is replete with instances where it
discusses the disputed material facts and then credits the
testimony of one witness, Dr. McGreevy, and disbelieves the
testimony of another witness, Dr. Seare.

In other instances, the

Court overlooks certain facts and misstates certain facts,
disputed or not.
First, on page three (3) of the Court's opinion, the Court
finds that "[a]lthough the University was prepared to certify
Seare to sit for the board exam to allow him to enter into a
plastic surgery residency, it refused to certify him to sit for
the board exam given his stated intention to practice medicine as
a general surgeon."

The facts show that there was no

determination on the certification of Dr. Seare.
-7-

The University

and Dr. McGreevy refused to certify Dr. Seare for anything at
all, including general surgery.

The only time a possibility of

certification, limited in scope or not, was discussed was in the
context of settlement negotiations between the parties.

Thus,

the conclusion by the Court as to this fact is simply not true.
Second, while it is true that the University argued that Dr.
Seare did not have the necessary experience for certification as
corroborated by several of the physicians with whom Dr. Seare
worked, several other physicians, also acting in response to Dr.
McGreevy's inquiry found and determined that Dr. Seare was
qualified for general surgery certification.

See Exhibit 15

attached to the defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment presented to the trial
court.
The statements and letters of the responding physicians
present a genuine issue of material fact on two fronts.
Initially, was the fifth year provided to and completed by Dr.
Seare standard or substandard?

The evidence on this issue

presents a genuine issue of material fact.

Despite the fact that

Dr. McGreevy contends that Dr. Seare's fifth year was not
standard and was by no means a "chief resident" year, Dr. Seare
contends otherwise.

Moreover, this disputed fact is exemplified

by the letters from the physicians responding to Dr. McGreevy's
inquiry.2

In addition, there is a genuine issue of material

2

For example, Dr. Lawrence E. Stevens, M.D., explains that
he expected Dr. Seare to proceed into a plastic surgery residency
and that Dr. Seare was qualified to do this, but that Dr. Seare
-8-

fact as to whether and why Dr. Seare's fifth year was
substantively different from the fifth year of other general
surgery residents.

Whether Dr. Seare's performance was deficient

is also a disputed question of fact.
Third, the court overlooks the nature of the general surgery
boards.

There is only one certification for the general surgery

boards.

Regardless of what the resident chooses to do after

general surgery training whether it be general surgery, plastic
surgery, orthopedic surgery, etc., that resident must be
certified as eligible to sit for the general surgery
certification.

The certification is NOT different depending on

the residents choice of practice area. All residents at the time
of their certification should be able to sit for the general
surgery boards with the knowledge, skill and guidance they have
acquired in their training to that point.

The facts before the

trial court, and consequently before the Court, illustrate the
common understanding of the parties that the ultimate goal and
would need more training before going into general surgery. Dr.
Kent F. Richards, M.D. finds that Dr. Seare is qualified to go
into general surgery after his fifth year. Whether Dr. Seare's
fifth year was a standard chief resident year as he was told it
was by Dr. McGreevy (this too is disputed) or was not is also
supported by disputed facts in the record. Dr. Richard R. Price,
M.D. comments that Dr. Seare should have the opportunity to
"perform in a true chief resident situation...." Dr. C. David
Richards, M.D. and Dr. Sherman C. Smith, M.D. both make reference
to Dr. Seare's chief resident year at L.D.S. Hospital. Exhibit
15 attached to Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 6, 1992.
Because there is factual dispute as to the nature of Dr. Seare's
fifth year of residency summary judgment at the trial court below
was inappropriate. Moreover, an affirmance of the trial court's
decision wherein there is a genuine issue of material fact is
also inappropriate.
-9-

purpose of completing a five year residency program, whether for
a general surgery or plastic surgery residency, was to prepare
Dr. Seare for eligibility to test for certification in general
surgery.

Regardless of Dr. Seare's change of heart during his

fifth year, he should have been eligible to sit for the general
surgery boards.

Whether

Dr. Seare was properly prepared, as a result of Dr. McGreevy's
alleged willy-nilly structuring of the fifth year, to sit for the
general surgery boards is a genuine issue of material fact which
was overlooked by the Court.
Moreover, the Court seemed to overlook the fact, based on
the single general surgery board certification, that there is no
difference in the status of being "board eligible" at the end of
the fifth year of training between those who have chosen to seek
further training and those who wish to work in general surgery
only.
Fourth, the Court seems to accept Dr. McGreevy's version of
the facts that Dr. McGreevy structured Dr. Seare's fifth year
differently from the fifth years of other residents.

If this is

the case, then there is a serious conflict of fact regarding Dr.
McGreevy's decision to do so. Moreover, the reasonableness of
Dr. McGreevy's refusal is also a disputed question of fact. The
record reflects that another doctor, Dr. Chris Tsoi, M.D., was
allowed to repeat his third year of residency two times.

In

addition, Dr. Tsoi did not have an authentic and bona-fide fifth
year, yet Dr. McGreevy certified Dr. Tsoi to sit for the general
-10-

surgery boards.

Such arbitrary decision making based on whatever

reasons raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding Dr.
McGreevy's and the University's standards.

The Court seems to

recognize this factual dispute:
Given the tailor-made nature of Seare's training [which is a
question of fact itself], the University was apparently only
obligated to certify Seare for additional training in a
plastic surgery residency if he satisfactorily completed the
five-year resident program designed specifically for the
purpose.
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals at page 8 (emphasis added).
Finally, the Court is fully aware of the dispute as to the
material facts. Throughout its opinion it discusses the
conflicting positions, both of which are part of the record, of
the parties.

("Seare on the other hand, .... "In contrast, Dr.

McGreevy testified ....") Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals at
page 3.

By recognizing the conflicting testimony and disputed

facts and then crediting certain testimony and facts, the Court
has committed and error and Dr. Seare's Petition for Rehearing
should be granted.

Because there are material facts in dispute

which the Court either overlooked or misapprehended, an
affirmance of the trial court's judgment and order was error.
IV.

BECAUSE THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
THE EXPRESS COVENANTS OR PROMISES OF THE CONTRACT(S)
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND BECAUSE THE COURT COMES TO THE
LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IS AMBIGUOUS, THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IS
MISAPPREHENDED.

Dr. Seare did not seek to create a contract via the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing where no contract
existed.

To the contrary, the evidence shows, as do the Court's
-11-

conclusions, that a contract did, in fact, exist, whatever that
contract may be.

lf

[E]very contract is subject to an implied

covenant of good faith, that implied covenant 'cannot be
construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not
agreed upon by the parties.'"
Leasing

Co.,

Sanderson

v. First

Security

844 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted).

Thus, whatever the terms of the contract were, which is a
question of fact, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing allows for relief when the promises and terms of the
contract are executed or not in bad faith by one of the parties.
Dr. Seare has maintained that the defendants have breached
the contract by acting in bad faith.
Generally, "a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships."

Benedict's

Dev. v. St.

Benedict's

Hospital,

St.

811 P.2d 194,

199-200 (Utah 1991). Under the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, each party to a contract impliedly promises
not to "intentionally or purposely do anything which will
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the
fruits of the contract." Id. at 199. A violation of this
covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contrsict. Id.
at 200. Whether there has been a breach of contract is
generally a "factual issue to be determined by [the* fact
finder] after consideration of all attendant circumstances
and evidence...."
Western

Farm Credit

App. 1993).

Bank

v.

Pratt,

860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah Ct.

The Court states that "[t]here were no express

covenants or promises to train Seare to become a general surgeon
or to automatically certify him to sit for the board exam."
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals at pages 8-9.

This

statement is contrary to the Court's legal conclusion that the
contract was ambiguous, see supra.
-12-

Moreover, the intent,

expectations, and understandings of the parties is a disputed
issue of material fact.

Thus, again the Court misapprehends the

facts and the law and errors in concluding that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not come into play
under the circumstances of this case.

Therefore, Dr. Seare

respectfully requests that the Court grant his Petition for
Rehearing.
V.

THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW AND OVERLOOKED THE
NATURE OF DR. SEARE'S COMPLAINT IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION OF DR.
SEARE'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM.

Dr. Seare is seeking prospective relief from the defendants
via his claims for violation of his civil rights and specific
performance.

" [S]tate officials sued in official capacity for

prospective relief are "persons" for purposes of Section 1983."
Will

v. Michigan

(1989).

Department

of State

Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71

Dr. Seare is seeking to have Dr. McGreevy certify him to

sit for the general surgery boards.

This is prospective relief.

If Dr. Seare cannot recover monetary damages pursuant to his
Section 1983 claim then so be it.

However, his claim for

prospective relief, i.e. specific performance is allowed under
Section 1983. It appears also from the Court's opinion that it
believes that the State and its actors have retained immunity
from civil rights actions against them.
Court of Appeals at page 9.

See Opinion of the Utah

This issue has been addressed by the

United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that sovereign and governmental
immunity statutes of the individual states do not bar Section
-13-

1983 suits. See Howlett
Felder

v. Casey,
In Howlett

v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356 (1990); see

also

487 U.S. 131 (1988).
v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356, a high school student

brought an action against the school board and three school
officials.

One argument presented by the school board in seeking

a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was that the Florida state
waiver of sovereign immunity statute did not extend to claims
based on Section 1983.

See id.

at 359. The District Court of

Appeal dismissed the complaint.

The Court of Appeal also agreed

with the school board, however, the Court of Appeal acknowledged
the holding of Martinez

v. California,

444 U.S. 277 (1980) "that

a state cannot immunize an official from liability for injuries
compensable under federal law."

Howlett,

496 U.S. at 3 60.

After considering the decisions in the lower courts, the
Howlett

Court turned to its analysis.

The Court expressed a

concern that if such an immunity defense were available to
prevent suit based on a violation of a federal right, "that a
state court may be evading federal law and discriminating against
federal causes of action."

Id.

at 366.

The Court explained

[f]ederal law is enforceable in state courts not because
Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise
be burdened or that state courts might provide a more
convenient forum--although both might well be true--but
because the Constitution and the laws passed pursuetnt to it
are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state
legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws "the
supreme 'Law of the Land,' and charges state courts with a
coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to
their regular modes of procedure.
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367.
In Martinez

v. California,

444 U.S. 277 (1980), at issue was
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a state statute that purported to immunize public entities and
public employees for any liability for parole release decisions.
The Supreme Court held that the statute at issue was preempted by
Section 1983 "even though the federal cause of action [was] being
asserted in the state courts."

Id.

at 284. The Court further

explained
"Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is
wrongful under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 or Section 1985(3)
cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the
federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to
have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee
into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the
Constitution insures that the proper construction may be
enforced. See McLaughin v. Tilendis,
398 F.2d 287, 290 (7th
Cir. 1968) . The immunity claim raises a question of federal
law.' Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973)
cert, denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1973).
Martinez,

444 U.S. at 284 n.8.

"[A] state law that immunizes

government conduct otherwise subject to suit under Section 1983
is preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation
takes place in state court, because the application of the state
immunity law would thwart the congressional remedy, which of
course already provides certain immunities for state officials."
Felder

v. Casey,
Howlett,

487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) (citations omitted).

Martinez,

and Felder,

make it clear that a state

law that immunizes government conduct from liability for
violation of civil rights is not applicable to claims made under
Section 1983.

Thus, the Court has misapprehended the law and Dr.

Seare's Petition for Rehearing must be granted.
In addition, the Court overlooked the law and the facts
regarding a constitutionally protectable interest of Dr. Seare.
-15-

Dr. Seare did have a constitutionally protected property interest
in attending the University of Utah.

Davis

v. Regis

College,

830

P.2d 1098, 1100 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] student's interest in
attending a public university is a constitutionally protected
property right."); Anderson

v. Regents

of Univ.

of Cal.,

22

Cal.App.3d 763, 770 (1972) ("Attendance at a publicly financed
institution of higher education is to be regarded as a benefit
somewhat analogous to that of public employment."); see
Conard v. Univ.

of Washington,

also

814 P.2d 1242, 1245-6 (Wash. Ct.

App. 1991).
Because the law supports a finding that Dr. Seare does in
fact have a constitutionally protected property interest in his
education and future employment premised on receiving his benefit
of the bargain, the Court misapprehended the law in concluding
that Dr. Seare's Section 1983 claim is not permissible.
Moreover, the law clearly states that state actors can be sued
under Section 1983 for prospective relief.

Thus, Dr. Seare

respectfully requests that his Petition for Rehearing be granted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the appellant/plaintiff respectfully
requests that the Court grant his Petition for Rehearing.
DATED and respectfully submitted this 29th day of September,
1994.
L. ZANEUGJLL, P,

L. Zarie Gill
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff
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